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We aim at a better understanding of the ineﬃciencies resulting from distributional
conflict in small open economies. To this end, a general equilibrium model with the
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outside option for capital. The overall distributional-conflict ineﬃciency is decomposed
into three components: (i) a fundamental time inconsistency problem; (ii) strategic in-
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1 Introduction
Conflict over the distribution of resources (i.e. "distributional conflict") is an unavoid-
able characteristic of every market economy. We believe that the way this conflict is
carried out has first-order implications for economic eﬃciency and social welfare. Much
research has recently been devoted to less developed economies which are character-
ized by imperfect property rights (e.g. Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996; Strulik, 2005;
Gonzalez and Neary, 2005). But even in developed economies with perfect property
rights fundamental distributional conflicts prevail. These conflicts are typically car-
ried out via the political process. The probably most important channel consists in
the manipulation of the tax and expenditure system by major interest groups in their
favor.1
We aim at a better understanding of the sources and consequences of distributional
conflict in small open economies. To this end, a simple general equilibrium model is
set up that captures the major characteristics of modern economies, relevant for the
analysis of distributional conflicts, i.e. two groups of agents (capitalists and workers),
an endogenous income tax, productive government expenditures, social transfers, and
an outside option for capital. We use this model to investigate the macroeconomic
consequences of distributional conflicts.
The paper at hand contributes to the literature on the macroeconomic consequences
1There are, of course, other channels like the implementation of regulations to the advantage of
specific groups. More generally, a number of real-world institutions are designed and implemented to
favor specific groups in society.
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of distributional conflicts along three dimensions:
First, the political mechanism employed in this paper deviates from the most com-
monly used political mechanism, i.e. the median voter principle. This is not to say
that the median voter principle is an invalid description of political processes. How-
ever, real-world political processes are also characterized by a country’s specific political
institutions, its political culture, and especially by the degree of organization of ma-
jor interest groups.2 The political mechanism employed in this paper is consistent
with the strong positive correlation between unionization rates and average tax rates
across OECD economies, as displayed by Figure 1 below. In addition, it gives rise to a
richer set of implications, i.e. the political equilibrium belongs to one of three regimes
("dominance of capitalists", "dominance of workers", "no group dominates"). A fur-
ther advantage is that we can easily distinguish between the presence and the absence
of strategic interaction in the political sphere.
Second, the analysis shows that the decentralized equilibrium is generally ineﬃcient;
the decentralized tax rate can be either too high or too low. This implies that it is
not in general one group which can be held responsible for an ineﬃcient tax rate. The
distributional conflict gives rise to either "weak ineﬃciency" (i.e. the tax rate deviates
from the first-best solution but a change in the tax rate would at least hurt one group)
or "strong ineﬃciency" (i.e. the tax rate deviates from the first-best solution and can
2In the median voter model all that matters is the preference of the median voter. Moreover, when
it comes to the analysis of distributional conflicts among two major groups in society, the median
voter principle is less instructive since it implies that it is always the larger group that can implement
its preferred policy, irrespective of the political influence of the other group.
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be changed such that both groups would be better oﬀ).
Third, the main contribution of the paper lies, however, in the decomposition of the
overall distributional-conflict ineﬃciency into three components. The first component
reflects a fundamental time inconsistency problem, which is due to the fact that domi-
nant groups are in general unable to commit to a specific policy (Acemoglu, 2003). The
second component is associated with the presence of strategic interaction in the polit-
ical process. The third component results from heterogeneity among individuals and
the resulting unavoidable conflict of interest. A calibrated version of the model (using
OECD data) is employed to demonstrate the numerical importance of distributional-
conflict ineﬃciency. The model implies a proportional output loss of about 7 percent,
which indicates that the distributional-conflict ineﬃciency may be quite substantial.
There is, of course, a substantial number of papers which deal with diﬀerent aspects
of distributional conflicts from a macroeconomic perspective. For instance, Hassler et
al. (2003) employ a dynamic OLG model with endogenous redistribution, based on the
median voter principle, to investigate the conditions for the "survival of the welfare
state". Acemoglu (2003) argues that ineﬃcient institutions, resulting from funda-
mental distributional conflicts in society, are likely to persist due to insurmountable
commitment problems in the political sphere. In addition, there are three strands of
well established contributions, which should be mentioned here: Romer (1975), Roberts
(1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981) investigate the sources and consequences of redistri-
bution with distortionary taxation. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980)
consider the time inconsistency problem in the context of capital taxation. Finally,
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Persson and Tabellini (1994), Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Bertola (1993) focus on the
implications of distributional conflicts in a dynamic perspective. All of these papers
do not, however, dig deeper into the diﬀerent components of the distributional-conflict
ineﬃciency, as they arise in every market economy.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model, which is
employed in Section 3 to develop the decentralized equilibrium. Section 4 describes
the first-best solution. The diﬀerent forms of distributional-conflict ineﬃciencies are
described in Section 5. The subsequent Section 6 decomposes the overall ineﬃciency
into three fundamental components. The model is used in Section 7 to evaluate the
quantitative importance of the ineﬃciency. Finally, Section 8 provides a short summary
and some conclusions.
2 The structure of the model
Output and factor markets are perfectly competitive. There are two types of agents,
capitalists (of mass one) and workers (of mass ), who are asymmetrically aﬀected
by changes in the tax rate. Government revenues are used to finance productive gov-
ernment expenditures and lump-sum transfers in favor of workers. Tax revenues are
collected by levying a uniform income tax on capital and labor income. The model
captures a fundamental distributional conflict, namely the struggle over market income
net of taxes and transfers between capitalists and workers in modern societies.
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2.1 Production technology and factor prices
The output technology for the final output good  exhibits constant returns to scale
in private inputs:
 = ()1−, (1)
where 0     1,  denotes productive government expenditures,  is capital
employed in the domestic market sector, 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is working time per worker,
and  is "the number" of workers. Let 0 ≤  ≤ 1 denote the uniform tax rate
levied on capital and labor income and  ≤  ≤ 1 the share of tax revenues devoted
to productive government expenditures.3 Productive government expenditures may
then be expressed as  =  . Hence, the reduced form technology, after having
eliminated , reads as follows:
 = () 1−

1−
 ()
1−
1− . (2)
Competitive factor prices can be expressed as:
 = () 1−
−1+
1−
 () 1−1− (3)
 = (1− )() 1− 1− ()
−
1− , (4)
where  is the rate of return on capital and  denotes the wage rate.
3The restriction  ≤  is important since the workers’ preferred tax rate would otherwise turn
negative. Moreover, this restriction is likely to be satisfied empirically, see Section 7.
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2.2 Capitalists and workers
Both capitalists and workers earn a competitive market income which is subject to
a uniform income tax. This simplifying assumption is not at all implausible. For
instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 305) notice that "in a sample of 14 OECD
countries, the average eﬀective tax rate on capital and labor were about the same
(about 38 percent) over the period 1991-1995."
The typical capitalist can employ his capital stock in the domestic market sector
earning a rate of return . The resulting market income is subject to an income tax
 . Alternatively, he has the option to earn the fixed rate of return ¯  0 by investing
abroad. Following Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Lejour and Verbon (1997) we
assume that investments abroad are subject to transaction costs, which accrue each
period. This might be due to transaction costs associated with foreign investments
resulting from, for instance, the foreign contract law, the tax system, and foreign labor
market institutions. Total investment costs of investing abroad are convex in foreign
investments and given by − ( − ), where   0 is the overall stock of
capital owned by the typical domestic capitalist such that  − represents foreign
investments, and  ≥ 0. For simplicity, we assume that the returns from foreign
investments are not subject to an income tax. Income of the typical capitalist is hence
given by:
 = (1− ) + (¯ −  − )( −) (5)
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The problem of the typical capitalist then reads:4
max 
 s.t. (5), (3), and  − ≥ 0.
Notice that income is maximized by choosing  and  . These decisions are made
sequentially, as elaborated in Section 3.
Workers supply 0 ≤  ≤ 1 units of labor services (measured in units of time)
inelastically to the market. The wage rate is denoted as . The resulting market
income is subject to an income tax  . In addition, workers receive social transfers. The
transfer per worker equals the total amount of tax revenues spent on social transfers
divided by the number of workers, i.e. (1 − ). Total income of the typical
worker is hence given by:
 = (1− )+ (1− ). (6)
The problem of the typical worker is as follows:
max 
 s.t. (6), (4), and (2).
2.3 The government
The government does two things: First, it collects government revenues according
the tax rate resulting from the political process. Second, it splits total tax revenues,
according to the share 0 ≤  ≤ 1, into productive government expenditures  and
4When maximizing with respect to  capitalists take  as given. This changes when deciding on
the optimal tax rate, as explained below.
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lump-sum transfers in favor of workers :
 = 
 = (1− ) .
Notice that the government is assumed to run a balanced budget, i.e. + =  .
2.4 The political process
Most theoretical models on distributional conflicts rely on electoral competition and the
median voter principle.5 We do not follow this route for the following reasons: First,
the political tax rate determination process is likely to be aﬀected by political culture,
political institutions as well as the degree of organization of major interest groups.
For instance, empirical data show that there is a strong positive correlation between
unionization rates and average tax rates across OECD economies; see Figure 1 below.
This simple correlation indicates that the (relative) strength of major interest groups is
likely to aﬀect the political outcome. The political mechanism employed in this paper
is consistent with this observation. Second, we think that one should not rule out the
presence of strategic interaction among major interest groups a priori.6 The reason is
that strategic interaction may act as an amplifier with respect to the equilibrium tax
rate and may therefore enlarge the welfare costs of distributional conflicts (see Section
6).
5According to Roemer (2001, p. 3) "probably 95% of the formal literature in political economy
since Downs has employed this particular specification."
6For a critical discussion of the Downsian model of electoral competition and the median voter
principle see Roemer (2001, Chapter 1.2).
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We employ a tractable shortcut formulation which allows us to take the power of
major interest groups as well as the presence of strategic interaction among major
interest groups into account. Specifically, it is assumed that the equilibrium tax rate
can be represented as a linear combination of the demands from the two groups:
 =  + (1− ), (7)
where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 gives the weight of capitalists in the political process, i.e. 1−  is the
weight of laborers, 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is the tax rate demanded by capitalists, and 0 ≤  ≤ 1
is the tax rate demanded by laborers. The weight parameter  can be interpreted as
capturing the political or bargaining power of capitalists, i.e. 1−  captures the power
of workers. To put this modeling strategy into perspective, several remarks are at
order.
(i) Instead of the linear specification (7), one could also assume that the tax rate
aggregation rule is  =    1− . This non-linear specification would make the model
more complicated without changing the qualitative results.
(ii) A plausible alternative, consistent with the piece of evidence captured by Figure
1, is a tax bargaining setup; in analogy to wage bargaining models (Oswald, 1985). The
equilibrium tax rate then results from max
¡¢ ¡¢1− s.t. (2), (3), (4), (5), and
(6). The equilibrium tax rate turns out to be a non-linear function of the bargaining
parameter .7 The main implications remain valid, i.e. the equilibrium tax rate is
bounded between the most preferred tax rates of capitalists ( ∗ = , determined
7This statement also holds true if the we assume that the Nash maximand is  + (1− ) 
instead of
¡¢ ¡¢1−.
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in Section 3.1) and most preferred tax rates of workers ( ∗ = (−1)− , determined
in Section 3.1) and it depends negatively on . The advantages of our specification,
compared to a tax bargaining setup, is that, first, the equilibrium tax rate turns out
to be a linear function of , second, we can easily take the presence (or the absence) of
strategic interaction into account, and, third, we are able to distinguish between three
political regimes (as explained in Section 3.1.3).
The presence of strategic interaction among major interest groups requires that
both groups have, at least to some extent, resolved their internal coordination prob-
lem. Of course, an influential position is that of Olson (1965) who has argued that
collective actions are very unlikely to occur in large groups because of inherent free
rider problems. Medina (2006) argues, however, that collective action problems typi-
cally exhibit multiple equilibria, including both cooperation and non-cooperation. The
solution to the collective action problem, i.e. the selection of the cooperation equi-
librium, then crucially depends on common beliefs individuals have about the actions
of others. Moreover, Elster (1982, p. 468) stresses repeated interactions and, in the
case of workers, class consciousness as mechanisms to overcome the collective action
problem.8
(iii) Our specification allows for a richer set of implications when compared to
the median voter principle. In particular, since capital ownership is typically highly
concentrated, the median voter principle would result in a decentralized tax rate equal
8Lancaster (1973) investigates the implications of the distributional conflict in a setting of strategic
interaction between capitalists and workers. Acemoglu et al. (2006) study the process of coalition
formation, employing a dynamic game framework, in political environments.
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to the tax rate preferred by the typical laborer. In contrast, the tax rate aggregation
rule (7) gives rise to diﬀerent political regimes, which crucially depend on the parameter
.
Our modelling of the political process shares some similarities with Becker (1983),
who has presented an analysis of competition among pressure groups for political in-
fluence, which in turn is instrumental to redistribution. The similarities are as follows:
(i) political decisions are the result of a competition among pressure groups, voting
does not play an explicit role; (ii) politicians and bureaucrats are assumed to carry out
the implications of the political equilibrium; (iii) there is strategic interaction among
major interest groups. Since we focus on ineﬃciencies for any given political power of
interest groups and not on its explanation, the key diﬀerence concerns the simplifying
assumption stating that "political influence" ( in our notation) is exogenous and not,
as in Becker (1983), endogenously determined by political pressure.9
9In Becker’s analysis "political pressure" depends on the amount of resources allocated to produce
political pressure and other characteristics, like the size of the pressure group.
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Figure 1: Tax rates and unionization rates in 2000 (OECD, 2006; ILO, 2006).
3 The decentralized equilibrium
The timing of events is as follows: (i) capitalists decide on optimal  ; (ii) the tax
rate is determined from the political process; (iii) production takes place and earnings
are realized; and (iv) consumption takes place. In the case of strategic interaction
among major groups, every group decides strategically, i.e. taking the aggregation rule
 =  + (1− ) into account. The model is solved by backward induction.
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3.1 Second stage: determination of  ∗
3.1.1 Capitalists
The problem of the agent who acts on account of the group of capitalists reads:10
max
{(1− )}  (3) and (7), (8)
where we assume that   0, which is determined at the first stage. From the first-
order condition for an interior solution, one can readily derive the interior segments of
capitalists’ reaction function:
 =  −
1− 
  (9)
Several aspects should be observed: (i) The slope of this reaction curve, which is
exclusively determined by the parameter reflecting the relative importance of the two
groups , is  = −1−  0; (ii) If capitalists alone could determine the tax rate,
i.e.  = 1, one gets  =  = , which is the Barrovian result (Barro, 1990). (iii) If
the capitalist’s political influence becomes negligible, i.e.  → 0, they opt for lowest
feasible tax rate such that the resulting  still is . Since we have imposed  ∈ [0 1]
the complete reaction function is given by:
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for  − 1−   1

 − 1−  for 0 ≤  − 1−  ≤ 1
0 for  − 1−   0
. (10)
10Notice that we can ignore capital income earned in the outside option since this component is
independent of  .
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3.1.2 Workers
The problem of the agent acting on account of workers is as follows:
max
{(1− )+ (1− )}  (2), (4), and (7).
From the first-order condition for an interior solution, one can readily derive the
interior segments of the workers’ reaction function to read:
 = (− 1)
(1− )(− ) −

1− . (11)
To enable a direct comparison with (9), we solve the preceding equation for  :
 = (− 1)(− ) −
1− 
 . (12)
Several points are worth being noticed: (i) Remember that we have imposed the
restriction   , which guarantees that the first term on the RHS is indeed positive.
Moreover, for   1 the worker’s reaction function always lies above the capitalist’s
reaction function since (−1)(−)   . (ii) The reaction curve of the two groups run
parallel to each other. This can be seen by inspecting (12), which implies  = −1− .
As a consequence, the political equilibrium ( ∗   ∗) will be a corner solution for at least
one group provided that   1. (iii) Assuming that there are no transfers to workers
( = 1) both groups prefer the same tax rate, i.e.  ∗ =  ∗ =  ∗ = . In this case the
two reaction curves are identical and given by  =  − 1− ; see equ. (9) and (12).
If the worker’s political impact becomes small, i.e.  → 1, they opt for the highest
feasible tax rate (see (11)) to prevent a solution  ∗ = . Since  ∈ [0 1] the complete
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reaction function is given by:
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for (−1)
(1−)(−) − 1−  1
(−1)
(1−)(−) − 1− for 0 ≤ (−1)(1−)(−) − 1− ≤ 1
0 for (−1)
(1−)(−) − 1−  0
. (13)
3.1.3 Political equilibria
Depending on the underlying parameter constellation, there are three possible solutions
for the equilibrium tax rate  ∗ =  ∗+(1−) ∗. These cases are illustrated by Figure
2 and summarized in Table 1. Notice that the reaction curve of capitalists (solid line)
hits the -axis at 1− and the reaction curve of workers (dashed line) hits the -axis
at (−1)
(1−)(−) .
Case (1) is labelled dominance-of-workers regime (): Provided that (−1)
(1−)(−) 
1 (implying 
1−  1), one gets  ∗ = 0 and  ∗ = (−1)(1−)(−)  1. The equilibrium
tax rate is then given by  ∗ = (−1)−  1.11 Case (2) is dubbed no-group-dominates
regime (): For 
1−  1 ∧ (−1)(1−)(−)  1 we have  ∗ = 0 and  ∗ = 1. The
equilibrium tax rate therefore is  ∗ = 1 − . Case (3) is denoted as dominance-of-
capitalists regime (): If 
1−  1 (implying that (−1)(1−)(−)  1), then  ∗ = −(1−)
and  ∗ = 1. The tax rate in this case reads  ∗ =  −(1−) + (1− ) = 
11Notice that ∗  1 since we have assumed here that (−1)(1−)(−)  1 and  ∈ [0 1].
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Figure 2: Reaction functions.
Table 1 provides a summary of the results. Consider the dominance-of-workers
regime. If the political impact of workers is suﬃciently high in the specific sense that
the measure of their importance exceeds their desired tax rate, i.e. 1 −   (−1)− ,
then workers are able to implement their preferred tax rate (−1)− by strategically
demanding a tax rate of unity (Case (1)).12 On the other hand, if capitalists are
suﬃciently powerful in the specific sense that   1 − , then capitalists manage to
implement their desired tax rate  by strategically demanding a tax rate of zero (Case
(3)).13 Finally, if both conditions for political dominance are violated the equilibrium
12This should be interpreted in a metaphorical sense: Under strategic interaction workers demand
the "highest admissible tax rate". In the real world there might be bounds on the "highest admissible
tax rate". For instance, it is quite plausible to argue that a tax rate demand which is "too high"
reduces the public support in the political process.
13The fact that capitalists are more likely to implement their desired tax rate as  increases is due
to the fact that workers always desire a higher tax rate than  and hence it becomes in fact easier for
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tax rate is 1−  (Case (2)).
Table 1: Diﬀerent political regimes and the equilibrium tax rate
Regime Condition Equilibrium tax rate
Case (1): Dominance of workers 1−  ≥ (−1)−  ∗ = (−1)−
Case (2): No group dominates 1−   (−1)− ∧ 1−     ∗ = 1− 
Case (3): Dominance of capitalists 1−  ≤   ∗ = 
Next we assume that the two groups cannot solve their internal coordination prob-
lem such that there is no strategic interaction in the political process. The equilibrium
tax rate, denoted as ˜ ∗, is then given by:
˜ ∗ =  + (1− )(− 1)−  . (14)
The equilibrium tax rate is simply a linear combination of the tax rates which maxi-
mizes income of the respective groups.
We now have four diﬀerent solutions for the equilibrium tax rate, i.e.  ∗,  ∗,
 ∗, and ˜ ∗. How do these compare to each other? To illustrate this point, assume that
the underlying set of parameters satisfies the restriction     1, such that (−1)−  
holds. Figure 3 shows the resulting tax rates as a function of . The equilibrium tax
rate, assuming strategic interaction among major interest groups, is represented by the
bold solid line, which comprises three segments: (i) (−1)− for 1−  ≥ (−1)− ; (ii) 1− 
for   1 −   (−1)− ; and (iii)  for 1 −  ≤ . The equilibrium tax rate in the
absence of strategic interaction as a function of  is shown by the dashed curve.
capitalists to implement their preferred tax rate as  increases.
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Figure 3 suggests that strategic interaction among major interest groups induces a
higher tax rate compared to the case of no strategic interaction provided that laborers
are strong in the specific sense   ∗ = −+(1−)+−(1+) .14 Conversely, strategic interaction
induces a lower tax rate provided that capitalists are strong in the sense   ∗. Hence,
strategic interaction may act as an amplifier with regard to the equilibrium tax rate.
Moreover, it is interesting to see that a tax rate determination according to the median
voter principle would yield the other extreme, i.e.  ∗ = (−1)− for   05 and  ∗ = 
for  ≥ 05, provided that one interprets  as population share.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium tax rates in response to .
The ranking of the four solutions can be summarized as follows:
0   ∗ ≤  ∗ ˜ ∗ ≤  ∗  1.
14The critical value ∗ results from 1−  =  + (1− ) (−1)− .
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Table 2: Notation - equilibrium tax rates
 ∗ equilibrium tax rate in dominance-of-capitalist regime
 ∗ equilibrium tax rate in no-group-dominates regime
˜∗ equilibrium tax rate without strategic interaction
 ∗ equilibrium tax rate in dominance-of-workers regime
3.2 First stage: determination of 
At the first stage, capitalists decide on optimal  . By doing so, they take the
equilibrium tax rate ∗ as given. Optimal is determined by the first-order condition
(1−  ∗) = ¯ − − , which can be stated more explicitly as follows:
(1− )() 1−
−1+
1−
 () 1−1− = ¯ −  − . (15)
This equation implicitly determines the equilibrium allocation ∗ as a function of
model parameters and  , i.e. ∗ = (¯      ; ). Unfortunately, this equa-
tion cannot be solved analytically for  . However, for the special case  = 0 (i.e. no
investment costs) an explicit solution is readily found:
∗ =
µ ¯
(1− )
¶ 1−−1+
() 1−− () 1−1−− . (16)
This solution shows that domestic capital supply is determined by the profitability
of the outside option ¯, the tax rate  (which unfolds two opposing eﬀects), and the
amount of labor supplied to the domestic market sector.
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3.3 The decentralized equilibrium
We now know the equilibrium tax rate  ∗ and the equilibrium capital allocation ∗ .
Moreover, since ∗ can be expressed as a function of the tax rate  , we can express
income of capitalists and workers (equ. (5) and (6)) as a function of the tax rate only.
Hence,  = () together with (5) and (6) gives:
() = (1− )()() + (¯ −  −() )( −()) (17)
() = (1− )()+ (1− )(). (18)
Figure 4 illustrates income of capitalists (), income of workers (), and aggre-
gate income () + () as a function of the tax rate.15 It can be recognized that
() and () follow an inverted U-shape pattern. Both () and () increase
initially with the tax rate because an increase in  leads to larger tax revenues, more
productive government spending, a rise in the marginal product of capital and labor,
and hence an increase in competitive factor prices. On the other hand, income net of
taxes decreases with the tax rate simply because the tax burden rises. Furthermore,
in the case of workers, there is an additional eﬀect since social transfers increase, given
, with tax revenues. This describes the mechanics of the base model with ¯ = 0.16
The existence of a capital outside option, i.e. ¯  0, together with foreign invest-
15The underlying set of parameters is described in Table 2 below.
16It should be noticed that the income tax does not, in this case, bias any private allocation decisions.
Nonetheless, there is a unique first-best tax rate, i.e. a unique tax rate which balances marginal benefits
and costs of a change in the tax rate from the social perspective.
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ment costs, i.e.   0, adds the following mechanisms of tax rate changes. In this
case, domestic capital supply becomes endogenous and hence the income tax becomes
distortionary. As  increases, capitalists tend to shift capital abroad. This reallocation
causes the marginal (and average) foreign investment costs to increase. Hence, ()
decreases strongly as  rises above a certain threshold.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
yK(τ ) + yL(τ )L
yK(τ )
yL(τ )
τ ∗DC τfb τ
opt
L
τ ∗DL τ
Figure 4: Income in response to the tax rate.
4 The first-best solution
The first-best tax rate is the solution to the following social planner’s problem:17
max {
() + ()}  (2), (4), (7), (17), and (18), (19)
17Here the first-best tax rate is determined by income maximization. Alternatively, the first-best
tax rate could be determined by maximizing a utilitarian welfare function. Both procedures yield the
same solution provided that a lump-sum transfer scheme is available.
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where the equilibrium amount of capital  is determined by (15). Once more, an
analytical solution is not available for the general case. Therefore, we will revert to
numerical procedures in the subsequent analysis.
There is, however, an interesting benchmark case, which enables an explicit solution.
For the special case ¯ = 0 the unique first-best tax rate is given by:
  =  , (20)
which is increasing in the productivity of governmental expenditures  and declining
in the share of the budget allocated to productive government expenditures .
5 Distributional-conflict ineﬃciencies
We are now ready to investigate the distributional-conflict ineﬃciency. Consider the
situation displayed in Figure 4. The decentralized tax rate lies somewhere between
 ∗ and  ∗ (both are indicated by vertical lines). Given the parameters of the
model, the decentralized tax rate is crucially determined by the relative political power
of capitalists and workers, as captured by . The unique first-best tax rate, on the
other hand, is indicated by the vertical line at  . There are at least two important
observations which are worth being discussed.
First, the decentralized tax rate can be either too high or too low. In a dominance
of capitalist regime, the decentralized tax rate is too low. In contrast, in a dominance of
workers regime, the decentralized tax rate is too high. The fact that the decentralized
tax rate may deviate from the first-best tax rate indicates that there is at least weak
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ineﬃciency.18 This implies that, at a theoretical level, the social planner could imple-
ment the first-best tax rate, thereby increasing aggregate income, and subsequently
use a lump-sum transfer scheme to realize any desired income distribution.
Second, provided that the tax rate is to the right of   (the tax rate which maxi-
mizes the workers’ income), the decentralized equilibrium exhibits strong ineﬃciency.19
This means that a reduction in the tax rate would not only increase aggregate income
but would clearly make both groups better oﬀ. The finding of strong ineﬃciency points
to substantial imperfections in the politico-economic equilibrium. The reasons behind
this failure will be discussed in the next section.
6 A decomposition of the overall ineﬃciency
The extent of the distributional-conflict ineﬃciency can be measured either by the gap
between the first-best tax rate and the decentralized tax rate, i.e. ∆ =  − ∗ R 0, or
by the gap between aggregate income evaluated at the first-best tax rate and aggregate
income evaluated at the decentralized tax rate, i.e. ∆ = ( )− ( ∗) ≥ 0.
6.1 Time inconsistency due to lack of commitment
The finding of strong ineﬃciency is due to a time inconsistency problem inherent in
the market economy. There are two critical assumptions which give rise to this time
18To be precise, weak ineﬃciency labels a situation where (∗) + (∗)  () + ()
holds.
19Strong ineﬃciency is characterized by (∗)  () and (∗)  ().
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inconsistency problem: First, the existence of a suﬃciently profitable outside option for
capitalists. Second, the underlying timing of events. More specifically, the assumption
that capitalists first decide on their investments and then the political process deter-
mines the equilibrium tax rate is crucial. The assumption on the underlying timing
of events is motivated by the observation that the relevant time horizon for foreign
(direct) investments typically exceeds the time horizon underlying political tax change
decisions.
The basic logic behind the time inconsistency result runs as follows. When workers
decide on their preferred tax rate, they take the amount of capital invested in the
domestic market sector as given. Capitalists, on the other hand, anticipate the equi-
librium tax rate resulting from the political process at the second stage. Provided that
workers are suﬃciently powerful, i.e.  is suﬃciently low, the anticipated tax rate can
be so high that capitalists invest a significant amount of capital abroad. As a result,
the workers’ income is depressed through two channels: First, a lower amount of cap-
ital invested in the domestic market sector reduces the wage rate because capital is
complementary to labor. Second, a higher tax rate implies a lower amount of capital
invested in the domestic market sector, which leads to a lower domestic capital income;
notice that, within the relevant range, capital income in fact decreases with the tax
rate. Hence, tax revenues from capital income, total tax revenues and, given , the
amount of social transfers in favor of workers fall.
We can use Figure 4 to illustrate the ineﬃciency as measured by ∆ =  ∗ −  .
The time inconsistency problem can be easily eliminated from the model by reversing
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the timing of events. If workers decide on their preferred tax rate before capitalists
invest, the time inconsistency problem vanishes. The reason is that, by construction,
workers now take the negative consequences of a higher tax rate due to the two channels
described above into account. The preferred tax rate in this case is   , i.e. the tax
rate which maximizes the income of workers. Hence, the ineﬃciency due to the time
inconsistency problem is given by ∆ =  ∗ −   .
The time inconsistency problem is basically due to the lack of a commitment tech-
nology. Workers are in fact better oﬀ if they could commit to demand a tax rate
according to   =  + (1 − ) instead of  ∗ =  + (1 − ). This would
indeed be optimal in the pre-investment situation. In the post-investment situation,
however, this solution is not incentive compatible anymore. Therefore, any attempt
to commit to a strategy according to   =  + (1− ) is not credible. Capital-
ists understand this commitment problem and hence correctly anticipate the strategy
 ∗ =  + (1− ).
It is instructive to view this problem from a slightly diﬀerent perspective. Ace-
moglu (2003) argues that a Political Coase Theorem is generally impossible. His main
argument stresses the fact that every contract needs a third party which enforces the
contract. Once dominant groups are involved, this enforcement is not guaranteed any-
more. This is due to the fact that dominant groups can, by definition, control the
government and hence there is in fact no independent superordinate third party.
A final clarification is warranted. The emergence of time inconsistency is crucially
driven by the timing assumption. In reality, there are, however, both short term as well
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as long term investment projects. In case of the former, the time span until a return
can be realized is shorter than the time lag associated with changes in the tax rate in
real world political systems. For long term investment projects, however, the opposite
is likely to apply. In their seminal paper "Time to build and aggregate fluctuations"
Kydland and Prescott (1982, p. 1345) state "That wine is not made in a day has long
been recognized by economists (e.g., Böhm-Barwerk [6]). But, neither are ships nor
factories built in a day." In case of long term investment projects the time span until a
return can be realized may very well be longer than the time lag associated with politi-
cal decisions to change income taxes. This then implies that the assumption according
to which capitalists decide on investment projects and then the political process deter-
mines the tax rate appears justified. If the structure of the capital stock is such that
it comprises both short term and long term projects, the time inconsistency problem
does only apply to the long term investment projects. Hence, when applying the cur-
rent model in order to decompose the sources of distributional conflict ineﬃciencies
quantitatively, one would overestimate the time inconsistency component.
6.2 Strategic interaction in the political process
Does the existence of strategic interaction among major interest groups intensify or
moderate the distributional-conflict ineﬃciency? At a general level, the answer to this
question is ambiguous. Three points are, nonetheless, worth being emphasized in this
context.
First, strategic interaction gives rise to the same tax rate, compared to the case
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of no strategic interaction, provided that  = ∗ = −+(1−)+−(1+) (see footnote 13). In
this case, strategic interaction cannot exert an impact on ∆ . Moreover, strategic
interaction leads to a higher (lower) decentralized tax rate whenever   ∗ (  ∗).
Second, consider the case ¯ = 0 such that   = .20 Assuming that  6= ∗,
strategic interaction always magnifies the ineﬃciency provided that  =  + . This
condition implies that the first-best tax rate   =  equals the decentralized tax
rate for  = ∗; remember that for  = ∗ the decentralized tax rate with and without
strategic interaction coincide. This constellation represents an important benchmark
case. Since strategic interaction always leads to a higher (lower) decentralized tax rate
whenever   ∗ (  ∗), it follows that the gap ∆ is always larger, in absolute
terms, under strategic interaction.
Third, the reverse result, strategic interaction moderates the ineﬃciency, is more
likely to occur when either (i) the first-best tax rate is close to the tax rate preferred
by laborers and when laborers are strong in the sense   ∗ or (ii) the first-best tax
rate is close to the tax rate preferred by capitalists and when capitalists are strong in
the sense   ∗. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that the first-best tax rate,
assuming that ¯ = 0, can be represented as an average of the tax rates preferred by
the two groups according to:
  =  ∗ + (1− ) ∗ ,
where  = −  0. Hence, if (i)  is either close to  and   ∗ or (ii)  is
close to zero and   ∗, then strategic interaction is more likely to moderate the
20The basic argument also holds true in the more general case ¯  0.
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ineﬃciency. The fact that strategic interaction can indeed moderate the ineﬃciency is,
of course, a second best implication. Given an ineﬃciency   6=  ∗, the presence of an
additional imperfection in the political sphere can moderate the ineﬃciency provided
that   is "close" to either  ∗ or  ∗ simply because strategic interaction pushes
the decentralized tax rate more towards  ∗ or  ∗ if one group is strong or even
dominates the tax rate determination process.
Taken together, strategic interaction is likely to magnify the ineﬃciency provided
that the parameter restriction  =  +  approximately holds true. Considering em-
pirically plausible values of the relevant parameters,  ≈ 06,  ∈ [03 0 4] and
 ∈ [02 03], this restriction is not unlikely to be roughly satisfied in reality. Moreover,
the extent to which strategic interaction magnifies the ineﬃciency depends on the fact
whether one group is strong in the sense  6= ∗.
6.3 Heterogeneity
Even if we remove time inconsistency and strategic interaction from the model the
decentralized tax rates are likely to deviate from the first-best tax rate. What is the
reason for this remaining ineﬃciency?21 This residual ineﬃciency must be due to
a fundamental conflict of interest. Since both groups are asymmetrically aﬀected by
changes in the tax rate, every group prefers a diﬀerent tax rate. However, heterogeneity
is not suﬃcient for ineﬃciency to occur. From the median voter model we know that
21Notice that productive government expenditures  do not cause an ineﬃency in this model. It
is true that  represents an external eﬀect from the perspective of the representative firm. However,
when deciding on the preferred tax rate individuals internalize the associated change in .
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political competition, based on the median voter principle, delivers an eﬃcient solution
provided that the income distribution is symmetric. In this case, the first-best tax rate
coincides with the preferred tax rate of the median voter (decisive voter).
Our model departs along two dimensions from this benchmark case. First, we do
not apply the median voter principle and, second, the income distribution is discrete
with two realizations ("income of workers" and "income of capitalists"). In this case,
there is simply no voter who prefers the first-best tax rate. Consequently, there is no
decentralized decision mechanism, relying on the principle of one voter being decisive,
that can deliver the first-best solution.
The remaining ineﬃciency can be labelled "natural ineﬃciency" since it could only
be avoided by an omnipotent social planner who sets the tax rate to its first-best level.
Put diﬀerently, the decentralized economy is intrinsically characterized by a conflict
of interest between the two classes. Since both groups are asymmetrically aﬀected by
changes in the tax rate, the political process is likely to give rise to a tax rate that is
diﬀerent from the first-best tax rate.
7 A simple numerical exercise
The simple model laid out above has only a small number of parameters and hence
suggests a numerical illustration. To this end, the model parameters are specified
numerically to calculate the implied welfare loss. To enable a sensible numerical spec-
ification of the parameters we disentangle the share of productive government expen-
ditures (labeled  above) and the share of social transfers (labeled 1−  above). That
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is, we set  = 1 and 1 −  = 2 and assume 1 + 2 ≤ 1 such that we allow for a
third category of expenditures (neither productive government expenditures nor so-
cial transfers). Expenditures on social security transfers as a percentage of total tax
receipts, 2, averaged to 35 percent in 2000 (OECD, 2006). The definition of "social
security transfers" is, however, somewhat narrow in the context of the model. Public
social expenditure as a percentage of total tax receipts among OECD countries av-
eraged to 60 percent in 2000 (OECD, 2006). This definition would, however, be too
broad. Hence, we let 2 ∈ {04 05 06}. There is also substantial uncertainty on the
the share of productive government expenditures and hence we choose 1 from the set
1 ∈ {02 03 04}. Moreover, the empirical literature indicates that the elasticity of
productive government expenditures in the production of final output should lie in the
interval  ∈ [003 02] (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1997, Section 4). For our quantitative
illustration we chose  ∈ {005 01}. The capital share of  = 03 is standard. The
assumption  = 06 means that individuals supply 60 percent of their time endowment
(net of recreation) to the labor market. The outside option for capital ¯ = 01 might
appear somewhat high at first glance. However, the implied rate of return on capital
earned in the outside option net of investment costs (associated with foreign invest-
ments) amounts to 0066 (more precisely, ¯ − − (=04) ∼= 0066). Table 3 shows
the underlying set of parameters.
Table 3: Set of parameters
Technology and endowment  = 03  ∈ {005 01}  = 5  = 06  = 20
Policy and capital outside option 1 ∈ {02 03 04} 2 ∈ {04 05 06} ¯ = 01  = 01
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The overall distributional-conflict ineﬃciency is measured by ()−(∗)(∗) . The de-
centralized tax rate  ∗ depends on the presence or absence of strategic interaction and,
additionally, on the value of the political impact parameter . Assuming, first, strategic
interaction among capitalists and workers in the political process, and, second, that
the economy is in a dominance of workers regime we receive welfare losses in the range
between 0.5 percent and 25 percent, as described by Table 4.
Table 4: Proportional welfare loss
2= 04 2= 05 2= 06
1= 02
 = 005  = 01
0.00458 0.01203
 = 005  = 01
0.01416 0.03985
 = 005  = 01
0.06558 0.25132
1= 03
 = 005  = 01
0.00454 0.01186
 = 005  = 01
0.01406 0.03932
 = 005  = 01
0.06520 0.24858
1= 04
 = 005  = 01
0.00452 0.01174
 = 005  = 01
0.01399 0.03894
 = 005  = 01
0.06493 0.24665
One recognizes that the proportional welfare loss increase with 2 and  and de-
creases with 1. The mechanics behind this observation can be understood by noting
that welfare loss depends on the gap between the first best tax rate,  , and the de-
centralized tax rate,  ∗, which is by assumption equal to the most preferred tax rate of
workers. This tax rate increases both with 2 and  such that the gap  ∗−  becomes
larger. On the other hand, the gap  ∗ −   becomes smaller as 1 increases.
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8 Summary and conclusion
Employing a simple general equilibrium model we have investigated the sources and
consequences of distributional-conflict ineﬃciencies in small open economies. The over-
all distributional-conflict ineﬃciency is decomposed into three components: (i) the
time-inconsistency component; (ii) strategic interaction in the political sphere; and (ii)
an unavoidable residual which results from heterogeneity. Furthermore, using data
for OECD economies we have used a calibrated version of the model to assess the
magnitude of the distributional-conflict ineﬃciency. This exercise indicates that the
ineﬃciency may be quite substantial. For our baseline set of parameters we find an
output loss of about 7 percent (recall that severe recessions are associated with an
output gap of around 3 percent).
These results leave us with a natural follow-up question: What are the mechanisms
that have the potential to reduce the distributional-conflict ineﬃciency. Since a discus-
sion of this topic would clearly constitute a separate paper, we restrict ourselves to the
following enumeration. There appear to be three such "mechanisms": (i) One obvious
possibility lies in the reduction of income heterogeneity, which could be induced by
appropriate government policies. (ii) At a theoretical level, one could think of a wage
contract implying that workers exchange a share of their wage income against a claim
on the capital income net of taxes. As a result, it becomes incentive-compatible for
workers to opt for a comparably low tax rate at the ex post investment stage. (iii)
A mechanism which is at work in reality lies in repeated interaction in the political
process. We did not model this aspect to keep the analysis as simple as possible. The
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political-institutional system then determines the relevant time horizon.
It appears interesting to consider the consequences of inequality aversion as a fun-
damental cultural factor (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) have
shown that "a small degree of inequality aversion" can lead to large equilibrium redis-
tribution. In an open economy, then, it seems that inequality aversion indeed magnifies
the output loss due to distributional conflicts.
The paper at hand contributes to the theoretical literature, which tries to under-
stand the diﬀerences in per capita income across countries. Recent macroeconomic
studies have decomposed the international variation of per capita income into three
basic components (Caselli, 2005): (i) physical inputs; (ii) technology; (iii) institutions
and policy. Olson (1996) has argued that the third component is substantial. We have
shown that policy choices are shaped by distributional conflicts and the way these con-
flicts are carried out. Our quantitative finding suggests that the distributional-conflict
ineﬃciency can indeed be substantial.
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9 Appendix (not for publication)
9.1 Reduced-form technology
Using  =  together with  = ()1− gives  = (()1−) 11− .
Plugging this expression for  back into  = ()1− yields:
 =  1−  1−

1−
 ()
1−
1− .
This is equation (1) in the main text.
37
9.2 Factor prices
The competitive interest rate is given by:22
 =  = 
−1 ()1−
 = (()1−)

1−−1 ()1−
 = () 1−
−1+
1−
 () 1−1−
This is equation (3) in the main text.
The competitive wage rate reads:
 =  = (1− )
()−
 = (1− )(()1−)

1−()−
 = (1− )() 1− 1− ()
−
1−
This is equation (4) in the main text.
9.3 Reaction function of capitalists
The maximization problem of capitalists can be expressed as follows:
max
½
() = (1− )() 1−
−1+
1−
 () 1−1−
¾
  =  + (1− )
and 0 ≤  ≤ 1
22Notice that it is necessary to first take the partial derivative w.r.t.  or  and then insert
 = (1−) 11− .
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given the worker’s vote and 0 ≤  ≤ 1 satisfying 0 ≤  ≤ 1. Formulating the
Lagrangian yields
 = () + 0(−) + 1(1− )
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be stated as follows (Sydsaeter et al., 2000, pp. 97)
()   = 
µ
 − 0 − 1
¶
= 0
() 0 0 = 0 = 0
() 1 1 = 1(1− ) = 0
1. 1 = 0 = 0 - no restriction is binding and there is an interior solution with

 = 0:
−() 1−
−1+
1−
 () 1−1−
+(1− ) 
1−  ()

1−  2−11− 
−1+
1−
 () 1−1− = 0
⇒  = 
such that
 + (1− ) = 
and hence
 =  −
1− 
 
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2. 1 = 0 and 0 6= 0 - negative tax rates are excluded, such that in light of condition
() :  = 0. If this is the case, we yield from () :  = 0. Since, we have
for interior solutions  = 0, we yield

  0 and therefore  − 1−   0.
3. 1 6= 0 and 0 = 0 - tax rates greater then one are excluded. Hence, we get
from () :  = 1 and from () :  = 0, where 

  0 implying that

 − 1−   1.
Collecting all the feasible outcomes for  together, yields
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for  − 1−   1

 − 1−  for 0 ≤  − 1−  ≤ 1
0 for  − 1−   0
9.4 Reaction function of workers
The workers’ maximization problem of is:
max
n
() = (1− )(1− )() 1− 1− ()
−
1− + (1− ) 1−  1− 1− ()
1−
1−
o
  =  + (1− )
and 0 ≤  ≤ 1
given the capitalists’ vote and 0 ≤  ≤ 1 satisfying 0 ≤  ≤ 1. Formulating the
Lagrangian yields
 = () + 0(−) + 1(1− )
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be stated as follows (Sydsaeter et al., 2000, pp. 97)
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(0)   = 
µ
 − 0 − 1
¶
= 0
(0) 0 0 = 0 = 0
( 0) 1 1 = 1(1− ) = 0
1. 1 = 0 = 0 - no restriction is binding and there is an interior solution with

 = 0:
(1− )(1− )() 1− 1− ()
−
1− 
+(1− ) 
1−  (1− )(1− )()

1−  2−11−  1− ()
−
1− 
+(1− ) 1
1−  (1− )()

1−  1− 1− ()
1−
1− () = 0
implying that
 = − 1− 
and hence
− 1
−  =  + (1− )
 = (− 1)
(1− )(− ) −

1− 
2. 1 = 0 and 0 6= 0 - negative tax rates are excluded, such that in light of
condition (0) :  = 0. If this is the case, we yield from (0) :  = 0.
Since, we have for interior solutions 

 = 0, we yield

  0 and therefore
(−1)
(1−)(−) − 1−  0.
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3. 1 6= 0 and 0 = 0 - tax rates greater then one are excluded. Hence, we get
from ( 0) :  = 1 and from (0) :  = 0, where 

  0 implying that
(−1)
(1−)(−) − 1−  1.
Collecting all the feasible outcomes for  together, yields
 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for (−1)
(1−)(−) − 1−  1
(−1)
(1−)(−) − 1− for 0 ≤ (−1)(1−)(−) − 1− ≤ 1
0 for (−1)
(1−)(−) − 1−  0
9.5 First-best tax rate - no outside option
Maximization of aggregate income
Forming the first-order condition w.r.t  in problem (19) yields after some manipula-
tions
− 1− + (1− )
1−  
2−1
1− + (1− ) 1− + (1− ) 1− = 0
Hence,
−(1− )− (1− )(1− ) + (1 − 1) + (1− ) = 0
which implies immediately that
  =  .
This is equation (20) in the main text.
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